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Note 
 
An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications of 
Physician Immunity from Medical Procedure 
Patent Infringement Liability 
Emily C. Melvin∗ 
Medical procedure patents first drew political attention in 
1993 after Samuel Pallin sued fellow doctor Jack Singer for in-
fringing his cataract surgery procedure patent.1 The lawsuit re-
sulted in an outcry from the medical community,2 culminating 
in a vote of the American Medical Association (AMA) House of 
Delegates to condemn medical and surgical procedure patents.3 
In response to the AMA’s lobbying,4 Congress passed 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(c), which did not change the patentability of medical pro-
cedures, but instead made medical professionals and their as-
sociated healthcare entities immune from infringement liabil-
ity.5 
With the passage of § 287(c), Congress created significant 
problems. First, because medical procedure patents are now 
unenforceable,6 they are effectively useless.7 It is impossible to 
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this Note. She extends additional thanks to the board and staff of the Minne-
sota Law Review with special thanks to Jason Zucchi and Lindsey Tonsager. 
Finally, the author sends her gratitude to Jim and Sandy Melvin and her 
friends and family for their support. Copyright © 2007 by Emily C. Melvin. 
 1. Bradley J. Meier, Note, The New Patent Infringement Liability Excep-
tion for Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIS. 265, 265 (1997); see Pallin v. Singer, 
No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 1996). 
 2. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 651 (1995). One physician stated that a 
victory by the plaintiff in the lawsuit could cause “profoundly devastating and 
mind-boggling consequences.” Id. The AMA called these patents “horrendous.” 
Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)—The Physician Immunity Statute, 
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 701, 707 (1997). 
 5. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). 
 6. Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search 
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determine how many medical procedures have gone undevel-
oped as a result of lost funding due to unenforceable patents.8 
Even for developed procedures, doctors may now be resorting to 
trade secrecy to obtain protection because Congress has elimi-
nated the benefits of patent protection.9 Second, § 287(c) vio-
lates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).10 Any TRIPS violation sets a prece-
dent for other nations to apply similar exceptions to other tech-
nologies.11 The United States must take the lead in intellectual 
property enforcement,12 because reduced intellectual property 
protection results in lost jobs and increased costs to U.S. con-
sumers.13 Thus, the growing importance of intellectual property 
protection abroad warrants further review of any provision in 
which U.S. compliance with TRIPS is questionable.14 
This Note argues that because § 287(c) violates TRIPS, 
Congress must find an alternative solution that appropriately 
balances the ethical and economic concerns regarding medical 
 
for a Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527, 
1557 (1997) (describing how the statute renders “patents unenforceable 
against the most frequent users of the patented procedures”). 
 7. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (“A patent without a meaningful remedy against infringement is like 
no patent at all.”). 
 8. Cf. id. (stating that it is unknown whether medical procedures develop 
swiftly without patent protection). 
 9. See Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Re-
cent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 365 (1997). These argu-
ments are equally applicable against § 287(c). See Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Pa-
tients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 613 n.54 (2000). 
 10. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (arguing that the statute raises questions about compliance with 
TRIPS); Ho, supra note 9, at 655–70 (detailing § 287(c)’s noncompliance with 
TRIPS). 
 11. See Ho, supra note 9, at 671–72. 
 12. Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 28, 2006), at 12, available at http://www.ustr 
.gov/assets/Document_Library/Transcripts/2006/September/asset_upload_ 
file794_9872.pdf?ht=. 
 13. Cf. 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (“Virtually every trade expert believes that worldwide adherence 
to TRIP [sic] means jobs for American workers, and lowered costs for Ameri-
can consumers as piracy of products is reduced and others pay their fair share 
of research and development costs.”). 
 14. Tackling the problems of intellectual property enforcement abroad is a 
priority of the United States. Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property 
Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 317 (2006); Schwab, su-
pra note 12, at 2. 
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procedure patents. Part I describes the general patentability of 
medical procedures under U.S. law and the debate over these 
patents. Part II discusses the problems that § 287(c) poses un-
der TRIPS. Finally, Part III addresses potential solutions and 
proposes a TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing system. This 
Note concludes that the most appropriate way to address the 
ethical concerns regarding medical procedure patents while 
providing an incentive to innovate is to adopt a compulsory li-
censing scheme that meets the TRIPS criteria. 
I.  THE DEBATE OVER MEDICAL PROCEDURE 
PATENTABILITY   
The patent system derives from Congress’s constitutional 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 Pat-
ents are considered necessary to encourage innovation by pro-
tecting the capital investments required to develop new 
technology.16 Thus, the function of patents is not to reward in-
ventors,17 but to “secure the invention for public benefit.”18 
It is well established that medical procedures are pat-
entable under U.S. law.19 Since 1954, when the Patent Office 
held that medical and surgical methods were patentable,20 nu-
merous medical and surgical procedure patents have been is-
sued.21 After the Pallin litigation, however, the AMA called for 
Congress to abolish these patents.22 The following sections de-
scribe the arguments for and against patentability of medical 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. Noonan, supra note 2, at 656. 
 17. See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT 
RIGHTS 2 (2d ed. 2005). 
 18. Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of 
Medical Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1987). 
 19. Ho, supra note 9, at 611. 
 20. See Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107, 110 (1954) (rejecting 
prior holdings that prohibited medical procedure patents). For one such hold-
ing, see Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 883–84 (1862). 
 21. See Noonan, supra note 2, at 653–55. 
 22. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CEJA REPORT 1-
A-95, ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE PATENTING OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES 8 (1995), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_1a95.pdf 
[hereinafter AMA REPORT] (describing the various ethical objections to medi-
cal procedure patents and urging Congress to outlaw the practice). 
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procedures and the congressional response to the AMA’s con-
cerns. 
A. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PATENTABILITY 
The AMA argued that medical procedure patents compro-
mise patients’ rights to privacy, practitioners’ freedom, the dis-
semination of information, and access to procedures at reason-
able costs.23 However, many academics consider patents 
necessary to encourage investment in the invention and devel-
opment of new technologies.24 These proponents argue that the 
AMA’s ethical objections have no force because, in the absence 
of patents, innovation is stymied.25 Thus, more people are 
harmed in the absence of patent protection because many bene-
ficial procedures go undeveloped.26 
1. Patients’ Rights to Privacy 
Opponents of medical procedure patents argued that moni-
toring medical activity for infringement would compromise 
physician-patient confidentiality.27 This confidentiality benefits 
public and individual health because “it encourages the patient 
to fully disclose his condition[, which makes] diagnosis more 
accurate and therapy more effective.”28 Yet, even opponents 
noted that it is possible to enforce patents without compromis-
ing confidentiality.29 Infringement litigation does not require 
disclosure of confidential patient information.30 Moreover, in 
practice, patient confidentiality is not absolute even in the ab-
sence of patent infringement litigation.31 Thus, most scholars 
have dismissed this confidentiality argument.32 
 
 23. See id. at 3–7. 
 24. See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57. 
 25. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142; see also 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch) (“It is impossible to state 
categorically . . . that tomorrow’s advances in ‘pure’ medical procedures will 
take place as expeditiously as possible absent patent protection.”). 
 26. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (describing the link between medi-
cal procedure patents and increased quality of health care). 
 27. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. 
 28. Burch, supra note 18, at 1155. 
 29. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. 
 30. Lee, supra note 4, at 715. 
 31. Burch, supra note 18, at 1155. 
 32. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 9, at 633–34; Lee, supra note 4, at 715. 
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2. Practitioner Freedom and Doctors’ Duties to Patients 
The AMA also expressed concern that a patent could influ-
ence a doctor’s medical judgment.33 Some physicians might per-
form an inferior procedure rather than license the patented 
procedure or risk an infringement suit.34 Thus, these patents 
decrease physician autonomy35 and compromise a doctor’s duty 
to provide the best medical care to the patient regardless of 
cost.36 On the other hand, proponents of medical procedure pat-
ents noted that absolute discretion of the physician is unrealis-
tic notwithstanding patent considerations.37 Furthermore, the 
fiduciary duties that doctors already face alleviate any poten-
tial compromise to patient care.38 Because doctors have a duty 
to fully disclose all of their interests when giving the patient a 
choice of procedures, the patient is able to make an informed 
decision, taking the costs of licensing and alternate procedures 
into consideration.39 
3. Incentives to Disclose: Preventing Secret Procedures 
The AMA argued that medical procedure patents encour-
age physicians to withhold information—an incentive which 
violates the obligation of the medical profession to “share tech-
niques as needed.”40 Physicians believe that patenting these 
procedures slows the dissemination of information about new 
techniques to the public.41 Thus, opponents of medical proce-
dure patents argued, when a physician has the option of pat-
enting a medical technique, she will be more likely to refrain 
from publishing that technique in a medical journal until she 
files her patent application or even until the patent is issued.42 
This contention ignores the fact that publication does not 
preclude patentability in the United States if the patent appli-
 
 33. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. 
 34. See Lee, supra note 4, at 703; Burch, supra note 18, at 1152–53. 
 35. Burch, supra note 18, at 1141. 
 36. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1547. 
 37. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1154. 
 38. Meier, supra note 1, at 267. 
 39. Id.; see also Joseph M. Reisman, Comment, Physicians and Surgeons 
as Inventors: Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 355, 371 (1995) (noting that a doctor owes a fiduciary duty to her 
patients). 
 40. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
 41. Meier, supra note 1, at 268. 
 42. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 4; see also Gocyk-Farber, supra 
note 6, at 1548. 
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cation is filed within one year of publication.43 In fact, propo-
nents of medical procedure patents argue that these patents 
reduce secrecy by requiring disclosure,44 which is one of the 
primary purposes of patent law.45 Without this protection, phy-
sicians could choose to protect their inventions as trade se-
crets.46 This alternative would be detrimental to the health sys-
tem,47 because many procedures would not be available to the 
general public.48 
4. Access to Procedures and the Incentive to Innovate 
The argument the AMA stressed most heavily was that 
medical procedure patents would result in reduced availability 
of procedures.49 A patentee could restrict the number of li-
censes or charge a high price for licensing—actions which 
would decrease patient access to the treatments and increase 
patient costs.50 Additionally, patented procedures are not peer-
reviewed—unless they are licensees, other physicians cannot 
study patented procedures without infringing the patent.51 
These arguments are compelling; however, they only apply if 
innovation would continue to occur absent patent protection.52 
 
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Meier, supra note 1, at 268. 
 44. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1539. 
 45. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 
(1933) (“In consideration of [the inventor’s] disclosure and the consequent 
benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is 
guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon the expiration of that period, 
the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled 
without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.”), amended by 289 U.S. 
706 (1933). 
 46. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 365; cf. Christopher T. Kent, Note, Re-
ducing the Scope of Patent Protection and Incentives for Innovation Through 
Unfair Application of Prosecution History Estoppel and the Recapture Rule, 10 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 595, 625 (2002) (noting that “if the value of the patent 
monopoly is reduced,” inventors may “resort to trade secrets”). 
 47. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (stating that the advancement of 
medical knowledge increases the quality of society’s healthcare system). 
 48. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2507 (2006) (describing the social costs of 
trade secrecy to include the obligation to hide valuable information from the 
public). 
 49. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3–5. 
 50. Id. at 3; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Frist) (“[H]ealth care costs would explode if doctors charged 
licensing fees for every new surgical or medical techniques [sic] they devel-
oped.”). 
 51. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 4. 
 52. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142. 
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If eliminating medical procedure patents removes the incentive 
to innovate, the result would be a decrease, rather than an in-
crease, in the availability of medical procedures.53 Thus, the 
AMA’s argument only has force if the medical procedures would 
have been developed in the absence of patent protection.54 
The AMA supported its claims by suggesting that patent-
ing medical procedures was unnecessary to promote innovation 
because “the development of medical processes usually relies on 
intellectual curiosity rather than the availability of capital for 
research and development.”55 This argument reflects an as-
sumption that physicians develop medical procedures, unlike 
medical devices and pharmaceuticals, during the course of 
practice.56 Additionally, the AMA asserted that professional 
rewards such as recognition, respect, and publication were suf-
ficient to encourage invention.57 
No empirical study has determined the developmental 
costs of medical procedures.58 While it is true that, unlike medi-
cal devices and pharmaceuticals, medical procedures do not re-
quire the investment necessary to gain FDA approval,59 it is 
impossible to state categorically that these procedures are in-
expensive to develop. Indeed, several notable medical proce-
dures required significant funding to develop.60 The Surrogate 
 
 53. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (“It would be really quite tragic if we were to find that a very large 
loophole were to be opened in the patent system that would cause investment 
in some of the most important technology—not just from an economic point of 
view but from a life-saving point of view, to cause that investment to dry up.”); 
Katopis, supra note 9, at 385 (“[The] lack of benefit for these investors would 
lead to limited patient access to new discoveries as people would be reluctant 
to invent.”). 
 54. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (“If the grant of a medical process 
patent decreases the availability of a health care process, an ethical objection 
may arise. This ethical objection fails, however, if patent protection is neces-
sary to make the medical procedure possible in the first place.”). 
 55. AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,024 
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“[U]nlike innovations in 
medical devices or drugs, pure-procedure innovations do not require huge in-
vestments of capital.”). 
 56. Ho, supra note 9, at 615–16. 
 57. Id. at 614; see also AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how 
the “prospect of publication” provided an incentive for Dr. Pallin to develop the 
new cataract surgery procedure). 
 58. Ho, supra note 9, at 615. 
 59. See Todd R. Miller, The International Suture: A Comparative Ap-
proach to Patenting Methods of Medical Treatment, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 443, 446 (1996). 
 60. See Lee, supra note 4, at 716. 
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Embryo Transfer procedure research required a $500,000 capi-
tal investment because the National Institutes of Health would 
not provide financial support.61 This funding would not have 
been available were there no chance that the invention could be 
patented,62 because private investors view patents as important 
for securing returns on their investments.63 Thus, the argu-
ments against patenting medical procedures hold no force if 
eliminating these patents “kill[s] the ‘goose that lays the golden 
egg.’”64 The costs of patenting are warranted if the procedure 
would never have been developed in the absence of patent pro-
tection.65 
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONER IMMUNITY STATUTE 
After the AMA’s protest, Congress considered legislation 
designed to address the ethical concerns of the AMA and oppo-
nents of medical procedure patents.66 Senator Greg Ganske 
first proposed a bill that excluded medical procedures from pat-
entability.67 Senator Bill Frist responded by introducing the 
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, which 
provided that it is not infringement for a patient, physician, or 
licensed healthcare practitioner to use or induce others to use a 
patented medical procedure.68 In the debate over these bills, 
legislators decided early on to focus on the available remedies 
 
 61. 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (citing Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57); Lee, supra note 4, at 716. 
 62. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (citing Noonan, supra note 2, at 656–57); Lee, supra note 4, at 716. 
 63. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541 (“Private investors are at-
tracted by the promise of a reasonable return on their investment and patents 
are the equivalents of such a promise.”). 
 64. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (quoting Commissioner Lehman). 
 65. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1142 (“Medical process patents therefore 
are justified insofar as they encourage the advancement of medical knowledge, 
which in turn increases the overall quantity and quality of society’s health 
care.”). 
 66. See Ho, supra note 9, at 606–07. 
 67. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Patents on Medical and Sur-
gical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789, 790 (1996); see 
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1995). 
 68. Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 794; see Medical Procedures Innovation 
and Affordability Act, S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995). 
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for infringement rather than on patentability.69 This compro-
mise between the Ganske and Frist proposals was appended to 
the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act and signed into 
law on September 30, 1996.70 
The resulting statute exempts medical practitioners and 
their employers from liability for infringing a medical proce-
dure patent filed after September 30, 1996.71 Thus, the pat-
entee has no remedy for a medical practitioner’s or related 
healthcare entity’s infringement.72 Although the inventor has a 
patent on his procedure, it is the equivalent of “no patent at 
all.”73 This solution is problematic. It provides no means for a 
patentee to collect royalties, and thus creates no financial in-
centive to innovate.74 Moreover, without patent enforcement, 
doctors are encouraged to protect their innovations as trade se-
crets.75 Finally, the amendment violates TRIPS and may have 
serious implications for intellectual property protection 
abroad.76 This final concern is the focus of this Note. 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE DEBATE 
OVER MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS   
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 
1995, and TRIPS is a mandatory component of the WTO sys-
 
 69. Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 795. 
 70. Lee, supra note 4, at 708; see Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67 to 3009-69 
(1996). 
 71. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). 
 72. Lee, supra note 4, at 708. 
 73. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch). 
 74. See id. at S11,847 (describing the Surrogate Embryo Transfer proce-
dure and arguing that patents are necessary for innovation when the costs of 
research are high). 
 75. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 365. It follows that if the amendment re-
sults in medical procedure patents being the equivalent of “no patent at all,” 
142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch), the 
same trade secrecy could result from § 287(c). Cf. Ho, supra note 9, at 613 n.54 
(“[A]rguments against the patenting of medical procedures are equally appli-
cable to arguments against enforcing medical procedure patents . . . .”). 
 76. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,843–44 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from 
Jennifer Hillman, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) (describing the in-
ternational implications of the proposed limitation); id. at S11,845 (daily ed. 
Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. Hatch) (describing the complicated issues the 
statute raises under TRIPS and stating that “[t]here is no consensus on these 
issues”). 
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tem.77 Thus, as a member of the WTO, the United States is sub-
ject to TRIPS, a comprehensive agreement on intellectual prop-
erty protection.78 TRIPS has been extremely successful, provid-
ing the United States with “new tools with which to badger 
recalcitrant countries, especially in the developing world.”79 As 
members of the WTO, many important developing countries are 
subject to the TRIPS provisions.80 These countries are of great 
economic concern to the United States because of their under-
developed intellectual property regimes and their potential for 
economic, political, and social power.81 
During the debate over § 287(c), Senator Orrin Hatch, 
Chairman of the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committee, re-
peatedly expressed concern that Congress had failed to ade-
quately address TRIPS compliance.82 Others, including the 
U.S. Trade Representative83 and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association,84 voiced similar concerns. The fol-
lowing sections detail how § 287(c) violates TRIPS and the po-
tential impact of that violation. 
A. MEDICAL PRACTITIONER IMMUNITY VIOLATES TRIPS 
TRIPS requires that patents confer on their owners the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the pat-
ented invention.85 In addition, patent rights must be available 
without discrimination by field of technology.86 However, under 
 
 77. Howard C. Anawalt, Intellectual Property Scope: International Intel-
lectual Property, Progress, and the Rule of Law, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY 55, 59 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003). 
 78. See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 28 (describing the unique 
“comprehensiveness” of TRIPS). 
 79. BÉNÉDICTE CALLAN, PIRATES ON THE HIGH SEAS, THE UNITED STATES 
AND GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1998). 
 80. See John F. Delaney, IP Aspects of Outsourcing, in 12TH ANNUAL IN-
STITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 363, 368 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 8821, 
2006). 
 81. See Bird, supra note 14, at 317–19 (describing developing countries’ 
weak intellectual property schemes and expanding economic markets). 
 82. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S11,843, S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) 
(letter from Sen. Hatch). 
 83. See id. at S11,843 (letter from Jennifer Hillman, Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative). 
 84. See id. at S11,845 (letter from Sen. Hatch). 
 85. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 28, Dec. 15, 1993, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
 86. Id. art. 27. 
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Article 30, member countries may provide exceptions to these 
rights if the “exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”87 Article 31 
also allows exceptions in the form of compulsory licensing, but 
imposes certain requirements on those exceptions.88 For exam-
ple, the license must be based on individual merits,89 the poten-
tial licensee must attempt to negotiate a license with the pat-
entee prior to obtaining a compulsory license,90 and the 
patentee must receive adequate remuneration.91 This section 
examines how medical practitioner immunity from infringe-
ment liability violates these TRIPS mandates. 
1. The Right to Exclude 
TRIPS Article 28 requires that a patent provide the pat-
entee with the right to exclude others from making and using 
the patented invention.92 With an infringement exemption for 
medical procedure patents, patentees have no way of enforcing 
that right in the United States.93 Patentees cannot sue medical 
practitioners, the most likely infringers of their product,94 for 
either damages or an injunction prohibiting use of the patented 
device.95 As a result, any medical practitioner can use the pat-
ented product without paying royalties. Prohibiting such unau-
thorized use is the essence of the right to exclude.96 Thus, 
 
 87. Id. art. 30. 
 88. Ho, supra note 9, at 668–69; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, 
art. 31. 
 89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(a). 
 90. Id. art. 31(b). 
 91. Id. art. 31(h). 
 92. See id. art. 28. 
 93. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,843 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (“The amendment would preclude a certain class of patent-holders 
from enforcing their patent rights against infringement, a change that renders 
these patents virtually meaningless.”). 
 94. See id. at S11,845 (letter from Sen. Hatch) (noting that medical practi-
tioners are “the most likely class of infringers” of medical procedure patents). 
 95. Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000), patentees may not sue a medical 
practitioner or associated healthcare entity for either damages or injunctive 
relief for performing a medical activity. 
 96. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 28 (describing the right to 
exclude for a process as the right “to prevent third parties not having [the 
owner’s] consent from the act of using the process”); PIRES DE CARVALHO, su-
pra note 17, at 247–51 (describing the scope of the exclusive rights). 
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§ 287(c) undermines patentees’ rights to exclude others from 
using their inventions, in contravention of TRIPS. 
2. Availability Without Discrimination as to the Field of 
Technology 
Under TRIPS, patent rights must be available without dis-
crimination as to the field of technology.97 This rule against dis-
crimination is subject to the exclusions from patentability,98 
but these exclusions apply to patentability, not enforcement.99 
Thus, a country may exclude medical procedures from pat-
entability, but all patents that it grants must be enforceable.100 
The TRIPS drafters added Article 27 to address concerns that 
patents would be granted but not enforced,101 which is precisely 
what Congress authorized in § 287(c).102 Some critics argue 
that this discrimination is justified because of ethical con-
cerns,103 but TRIPS categorically prohibits all discriminatory 
acts, whether justifiable or not.104 Thus, an exception based on 
enforcement rather than patentability violates TRIPS unless 
the exception meets the requirements of Article 30 or 31. 
3. Acceptable Exceptions 
TRIPS Article 30 allows countries to make exceptions to 
patent rights provided that the exceptions “do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties.”105 TRIPS allows for only a very narrow exception to pat-
ent rights;106 it does not permit undermining the substantive 
TRIPS provisions entirely.107 An earlier draft of Article 30 sug-
 
 97. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 27. 
 98. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 167. 
 99. Ho, supra note 9, at 657–58. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 659. 
 102. See id. at 613 n.54 (“[S]ection 287(c) precludes complete patent protec-
tion by denying full enforceability of patents.”). 
 103. In support of the medical practitioner infringement exemption, Sena-
tor Frist described the AMA’s various concerns regarding medical procedure 
patents. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023–24 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996). These con-
cerns were all ethical in nature. See id. 
 104. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 170. 
 105. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 30. 
 106. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 306. 
 107. Ho, supra note 9, at 661. 
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gested prior use, non-commercial use, and experimental use as 
examples of acceptable exceptions.108 Although these examples 
were not included in the final language of TRIPS, they “reveal 
what drafters envisioned as appropriate balances under 
[A]rticle 30.”109 
One commentator argues that because medical patents are 
usually not enforced against doctors, this exemption does not 
unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of patents in 
the medical field.110 However, in the case of medical procedure 
patents, medical practitioners are the most likely to use the 
patent.111 Granting these practitioners immunity from liability 
prevents the patentee from making a profit by licensing tech-
nology to those who will use it.112 Furthermore, the § 287(c) ex-
ception goes far beyond any of the examples the TRIPS framers 
suggested. None of these examples goes so far as to prohibit in-
definitely enforcement against the most likely users of a pat-
ented process.113 Thus, the exemption seriously undermines the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner.114 Although patients’ 
interests are relevant,115 the exceptions cannot “emasculate the 
general principles established in the agreements.”116 
One scholar also suggests that Article 30 is only appropri-
ate in the absence of a specific Article 27 exception.117 Because 
Article 27 explicitly authorizes exclusion of medical procedures 
from patentability, Article 30 cannot be used to “dilute” the 
regular patent rules.118 Thus, the physician immunity statute 
is not an appropriate exception under Article 30. The physician 
immunity statute also is not an appropriate compulsory licens-
ing system under Article 31, because it does not meet the speci-
 
 108. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY 
AND ANALYSIS 158 (1998); see also Ho, supra note 9, at 666. 
 109. Ho, supra note 9, at 666. 
 110. See Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 796–97. 
 111. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch). 
 112. See Ho, supra note 9, at 663. 
 113. See GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 158; see also Ho, supra note 9, at 666. 
 114. See Ho, supra note 9, at 661–63. 
 115. Article 30 takes third-party interests into account when considering 
the propriety of an exception. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 30. 
 116. Ho, supra note 9, at 661. 
 117. See GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 159. 
 118. Id. (“The general exception may thus be invoked only where no special 
exception exists, and not to dilute rules applying to such specific exceptions.”). 
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fied requirements.119 Most notably, the patentee receives no 
royalties. 
B. THE IMPACT OF A TRIPS VIOLATION ON THE UNITED STATES 
The failure of the United States to adhere to TRIPS may 
result in trade retaliation.120 More importantly, however, it 
may have serious effects on the ability of the United States to 
increase intellectual property protection in important emerging 
economies. 
1. The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in 
Emerging Economies 
Protection of intellectual property assets abroad is a topic 
of utmost importance to U.S. companies, inventors, and gov-
ernment officials.121 Intellectual property protection is impor-
tant for maintaining American jobs and ensuring low costs for 
American consumers, because piracy results in an unfair com-
petitive advantage for companies that do not pay the costs of 
research and development.122 Emerging economies represent 
some of the largest potential markets for American products.123 
Unfortunately, these markets also present serious difficulties 
for intellectual property protection.124 The United States has 
led efforts to increase intellectual property protection in these 
countries and has made large strides toward that goal.125 For 
example, China—one of the most important emerging econo-
mies—joined the WTO and became immediately subject to 
TRIPS.126 However, intellectual property protection in China 
 
 119. See Ho, supra note 9, at 668–70. For a complete list of the Article 31 
requirements, see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31. 
 120. Ho, supra note 9, at 653. 
 121. See Bird, supra note 14, at 317; Schwab, supra note 12, at 2. 
 122. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch). 
 123. See CALLAN, supra note 79, at 31 (“The emerging markets . . . promise 
an ever growing, ever richer consumer base for IP products.”); Bird, supra note 
14, at 317–19 (describing the growth of emerging markets and their impor-
tance to American firms). 
 124. See Bird, supra note 14, at 318–19 (“The lack of intellectual property 
rights protection ranks for many firms as the single most significant threat to 
their international competitiveness.”); Schwab, supra note 12, at 1 (illustrat-
ing U.S. industries’ losses from piracy). 
 125. TRIPS has been a success, giving the United States tools with which 
to encourage developing countries to provide adequate intellectual property 
protection. See CALLAN, supra note 79, at 16. 
 126. Delaney, supra note 80, at 368. 
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and other emerging economies remains problematic127 as un-
derdeveloped enforcement mechanisms allow piracy to run 
rampant.128 
2. The Precedential Effects of a U.S. TRIPS Violation 
If the United States wishes to continue strengthening its 
intellectual property protection abroad, it must remain a leader 
in intellectual property protection.129 One of the foremost ways 
the United States can show leadership is by fully complying 
with the TRIPS provisions.130 The § 287(c) exception is not 
based upon the optional exclusion from patentability, but upon 
ethical considerations relating to enforcement,131 which apply 
with equal force to pharmaceuticals and medical devices.132 
These types of intellectual property are key technologies, the 
rights of which are important for the United States to protect 
abroad.133 Should § 287(c) remain intact, it will create a dan-
gerous precedent.134 Other countries may argue that because of 
ethical considerations, the legitimate interests of third parties 
 
 127. See id. 
 128. Bird, supra note 14, at 334. 
 129. See Schwab, supra note 12, at 12 (“[I]t is important that we are out in 
front, that we play a leadership role and lead by example to encourage other 
countries to do more.”). 
 130. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,844 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch); see also Ho, supra note 9, at 671 (“[E]ven an appearance of a 
TRIPS violation may impact how other member nations implement TRIPS and 
how they react to the United States in future discussions regarding intellec-
tual property protection.”). 
 131. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Frist). 
 132. The AMA was once concerned with the patenting of drugs and medical 
devices. See Katopis, supra note 9, at 353–54. While the incentives to innovate 
are arguably different, the ethical concerns over patenting medical devices are 
virtually the same as the ethical concerns about medical procedure patents. 
See id. at 356. Similarly, developing nations often cite access to pharmaceuti-
cals as a justification for compulsory licensing. See Susan Vastano Vaughan, 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under TRIPS: What Standard of 
Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (2001). 
 133. The loss to the pharmaceutical industry due to intellectual property 
infringement is estimated at twenty-two billion dollars per year. Schwab, su-
pra note 12, at 1. 
 134. See Ho, supra note 9, at 672 (“Other nations may be less likely to up-
hold the TRIPS provisions if they perceive that the United States, a major 
proponent of the TRIPS agreement, ignores its provisions.”); Meier, supra note 
1, at 276–77 (“Since the new law allows an infringement liability exception, 
other GATT-TRIPs members might follow this example and apply this type of 
exception to other technologies.”). 
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justify exceptions for other technologies, such as pharmaceuti-
cals or medical devices, under TRIPS Article 30.135 Given the 
growing importance of intellectual property rights abroad, es-
pecially in the field of pharmaceuticals,136 this is a risk that 
Congress must seriously consider. 
III.  SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBATE OVER MEDICAL 
PROCEDURE PATENTS   
Before Congress adopted § 287(c), the AMA argued for the 
complete exclusion of medical procedures from patentability.137 
If § 287(c) were repealed, the AMA would likely resurrect this 
argument. Conversely, others would argue that medical proce-
dures should be eligible for fully enforceable patent protection. 
Parts III.A and III.B describe why these solutions are unsatis-
factory. Part III.C proposes an appropriately designed compul-
sory licensing system that will address the AMA’s ethical con-
cerns while maintaining the incentive to innovate. 
A. THE PROBLEMS WITH ELIMINATING PATENTABILITY 
The physician immunity statute largely addresses the ethi-
cal concerns of the medical community.138 If Congress were to 
repeal this exemption because of its TRIPS implications, many 
physicians would argue that medical procedure patents should 
be excluded altogether.139 This solution is unsatisfactory. Some 
important medical procedures would not have been developed 
 
 135. The general exceptions can be applied to any field of technology, not 
just those specifically exempt. Cf. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 159 (describing 
how the general exception only applies when no specific exception exists). 
Thus, other parties to TRIPS may apply such an exception to other technolo-
gies. Meier, supra note 1, at 276–77. 
 136. See Schwab, supra note 12, at 1 (describing the pharmaceutical indus-
try’s losses from piracy). 
 137. See generally AMA REPORT, supra note 22 (describing the AMA’s ethi-
cal objections to medical procedure patents). 
 138. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Frist) (citing healthcare costs, invasion of privacy, the exchange of infor-
mation, and peer review as reasons for the legislation); AMA REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 2–5 (citing increased costs of health care, patient confidentiality, 
and the availability of information as justifications for opposing medical pro-
cedure patents). 
 139. For instance, during the debate over the Ganske amendment, which 
would have forbidden the Patent and Trademark Office from issuing patents 
on medical procedures, “no one spoke against the basic thrust of the litiga-
tion.” Mossinghoff, supra note 67, at 792. 
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without private funding.140 The AMA argues that these are rare 
exceptions.141 However, as technology develops, the cost of new 
medical procedures is increasing.142 At the same time, public 
funding for such procedures is decreasing.143 Private funds for 
research are not available without patent protection,144 because 
private investors view patentability as important for ensuring 
returns on their investments.145 While medical practitioners 
may view public notoriety and the health of their patients as 
sufficient rewards for their innovation, these benefits will not 
satisfy a private investor.146 Thus, without patents, venture 
capitalists will be unwilling to invest,147 and without capital, 
doctors cannot afford to develop new procedures. If medical 
procedures are not patentable, it is impossible to determine 
how many innovations will be lost due to a lack of funding.148 
In the absence of patent protection, physicians and inves-
tors would need to protect procedures that were developed at 
high costs as trade secrets in order to recoup their invest-
 
 140. For example, the Surrogate Embryo Transfer procedure required sig-
nificant cost to develop. See Noonan, supra note 2, at 657. The researchers 
were forced to obtain private funding after the National Institutes of Health 
refused to fund the research. Id. 
 141. See AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 7 (“[Surrogate Embryo Transfer] 
is one obvious counterexample, yet this alone does not undermine a prohibi-
tion on patenting of medical procedures, as we do not, in any context, require 
general rules to meet the impossible condition of working faultlessly.”). 
 142. See Burch, supra note 18, at 1143. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,847 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (“It seems unlikely that the inventor of the [Surrogate Embryo Trans-
fer] process would have gotten this private funding if the process was not pat-
entable subject matter.”). 
 145. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541 (providing that investors be-
lieve patents will ensure a return on their investments); cf. Ove Granstrand, 
Innovations and Intellectual Property Studies: An Introduction and Overview 
of a Developing Field, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9, 15 
(Ove Granstrand ed., 2003) (“[W]hen innovations require investments, as for 
most technological innovations, some laws for public or private provision of the 
investments are required.”). 
 146. See Granstrand, supra note 145, at 11 (“[I]ncentive structures differ 
among individuals, some preferring monetary rewards in the first place, some 
fame and social recognition, some satisfaction from achievement and so 
forth.”). 
 147. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1541. 
 148. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (providing that patent protection is a means of ensuring efficient medi-
cal procedure development); Noonan, supra note 2, at 656 (“[T]he patent grant 
is considered necessary to . . . protect large capital investments that are often 
required to develop new technologies.”). 
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ments.149 Physicians could use trade secrecy to maintain mo-
nopolies and charge high prices.150 This response would harm 
society because many procedures would remain hidden from 
the general public.151 Furthermore, other physicians might try 
to develop similar procedures independently, a tactic which 
wastes societal resources by promoting duplicative research 
rather than new discoveries.152 Thus, the risks of eliminating 
medical procedures from patentability are too great to justify 
the ethical concerns these patents present. 
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH FULLY ENFORCEABLE MEDICAL 
PROCEDURE PATENTS 
An alternative to eliminating medical procedures from pat-
entability is to simply repeal § 287(c).153 This approach would 
make medical procedure patents fully enforceable and reinstate 
incentives to innovate. However, this approach does not ad-
dress the ethical concerns of the AMA and other opponents of 
these patents. Most significantly, fully enforceable patents on 
medical procedures would likely result in limited patient access 
to the procedures. 
Patentees could control the licenses they grant through en-
forcement of their patents.154 Although patentees would have 
the incentive to license their procedures to as many physicians 
 
 149. Cf. Kent, supra note 46, at 625 (stating that inventors may seek trade 
secret protection if the value of patent protection decreases). 
 150. Trade secrets are valuable because they are not known or ascertain-
able by others. See KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 24–27 (2d ed. 2005). 
 151. See Reichman, supra note 48, at 2507 (“The well-known social costs of 
trade secret protection stem principally from the innovator’s expenses in pre-
serving secrecy and from the obligation not to disclose technically valuable in-
formation to the public.”). 
 152. See Kent, supra note 46, at 625–26 (“[I]nstead of spending their 
resources on improvements of a disclosed innovation, they will be wastefully 
spending on research that duplicates the research of their competitor. As a 
result, the pace of innovation will slacken.”). Scholars have expressed similar 
concerns in other scientific fields. See Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the 
Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 255, 261–62 (2003) 
(describing how, in the absence of gene patents, overly duplicative “research 
and science would lead to a most inefficient and unethical result”); Sheldon 
Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1999) (“Scientists, instead of sharing their 
discoveries in a timely fashion, are protecting them as trade secrets. This has 
resulted in wasteful duplication of research . . . .”). 
 153. See Ho, supra note 9, at 674–75. 
 154. See Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1544–45. 
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as possible to increase revenues,155 licensees would not have ac-
cess to any legal mechanism to ensure that these licenses are 
granted as widely as possible and at a reasonable price.156 For 
example, patentees could charge high license prices for proce-
dures that were relatively inexpensive to develop. Furthermore, 
patentee doctors would be tempted to refuse licenses to hospi-
tals with which they compete so as to attract patients and re-
duce competition. This alternative approach could cause the 
very outcomes the AMA feared—increased healthcare costs and 
decreased availability of procedures. 
C. A COMPULSORY LICENSE SYSTEM IN LIGHT OF TRIPS 
Eliminating medical procedures from patentability fails to 
address patentees’ and investors’ needs, but repealing § 287(c) 
neglects patients’ interests. A solution that balances the con-
cerns of the medical community with incentives to innovate is 
necessary. Adopting a compulsory licensing scheme for medical 
procedure patents offers an ideal solution.157 Although the 
United States has typically been highly skeptical of compulsory 
licensing systems,158 the currently imposed physician immunity 
statute is essentially the equivalent of a compulsory license 
without remuneration.159 Unlike § 287(c), a compulsory licens-
ing system ensures that patentees receive financial rewards for 
their inventions. Thus, in light of the goals of the U.S. patent 
system, a compulsory licensing system that complies with 
TRIPS Article 31 is a preferable alternative to the current sys-
tem. If designed properly, such a system will ensure that the 
incentive to innovate is maintained without limiting patient ac-
cess to procedures. 
 
 155. Cf. Amy L. Landers, Working Together in a Digital World: An Intro-
duction, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 205 (2006) (suggesting collection of royalties 
as an incentive to license patents). 
 156. Cf. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 6, at 1545 (“[T]he patentees may charge 
any price for the licenses and royalties. The prices are regulated by the mar-
ket; thus, according to a basic supply and demand theory.”). 
 157. Other articles have suggested that compulsory licensing may be a so-
lution, but none has offered a detailed suggestion. See Ho, supra note 9, at 
674; Miller, supra note 59, at 455; Noonan, supra note 2, at 664. 
 158. See Ho, supra note 9, at 647 (“Congress has provided for very few 
statutorily imposed compulsory licenses and has restricted the scope of those 
licenses.”). 
 159. See id. at 607 (calling the statute a “royalty-free, compulsory license”). 
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1. A Proposed Compulsory Licensing System 
In order to effectively address ethical concerns while pro-
viding an incentive to innovate, Congress should adopt a com-
pulsory licensing system including the following provisions: 
First, if the parties are unable to negotiate a license after 
reasonable effort, a potential licensee (whether an individual 
healthcare provider or an employer on behalf of all its health-
care providers) may apply to an administrative board for a li-
cense to use the procedure for all patients meeting specified cri-
teria.160 If the board finds that this class of patients will benefit 
from the procedure, it will determine a reasonable royalty 
based on fair market value that the licensee must pay the pat-
entee for each procedure.161 Such a license will be non-exclusive 
and non-assignable. In the case of an emergency, however, the 
medical professional may use a patented procedure without 
prior authorization162 and must apply for a license within a rea-
sonable time after use of the procedure, at which time the 
board will determine adequate remuneration.163 
Second, a patentee may waive the requirement that poten-
tial licensees individually negotiate for a license by submitting 
her patent to the board to determine a reasonable royalty. The 
board will then grant a universal license for a reasonable roy-
alty to medical practitioners to practice the procedure on all pa-
tients meeting certain criteria. Finally, all decisions of the 
board shall be subject to judicial review. Any licenses granted 
will be available for treatment only within the United States. 
A system with these features will ensure that the United 
States is in compliance with TRIPS. It will also maintain the 
incentive to innovate, while requiring that the procedure be 
available to all those in need. 
2. TRIPS Compliance 
TRIPS recognizes exceptions to patent enforceability in the 
form of compulsory licensing, provided the licensing scheme 
 
 160. TRIPS only permits use when the potential licensee has made previ-
ous efforts to obtain authorization from the patentee. See TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 85, art. 31(b). 
 161. This authorization of use of the patented process is based on individ-
ual merits. See id. art. 31(a). 
 162. TRIPS allows waiver of the requirement of previous negotiation in the 
case of national emergency or extreme urgency. See id. art. 31(b). 
 163. Id. art. 31(h). 
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meets the requirements of Article 31.164 First, an application 
for a compulsory license must be “considered on its individual 
merits.”165 Thus, certain categories of inventions may not 
automatically become eligible for a license.166 “The mere fact 
that the prospective licensee has unsuccessfully attempted to 
obtain a voluntary license from the patent owner is not a suffi-
cient reason for the grant of a compulsory license.”167 The pro-
posed system does not automatically grant licenses. Instead, 
the board will grant a license only if the procedure will benefit 
a class of patients. Therefore, this proposed compulsory licens-
ing regime satisfies this TRIPS requirement. 
Second, a user must make reasonable efforts to obtain a li-
cense on reasonable commercial terms, except in the case of an 
emergency.168 By allowing a potential licensee to apply for a 
patent only after making a reasonable effort to negotiate a li-
cense, the proposal meets this requirement. While the proposal 
allows the patentee to waive this requirement, this provision 
does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent or 
prejudice the patent owner, because the patentee is still paid 
adequate remuneration, but with lower transaction costs.169 
Finally, by allowing physicians to use the procedure without 
permission in the case of an emergency, the proposal addresses 
the realities of medical practice. 
Third, “the scope and duration of such use [must] be lim-
ited to the purpose for which it was authorized.”170 The pro-
posed compulsory licensing regime allows the board to grant a 
license for use on a class of patients who meet certain criteria. 
Thus, the license is restricted to use on patients who will bene-
fit from the procedure, meeting the requirements of Article 
31(c). 
 
 164. See id. art. 31. This Note does not describe in detail sections (d), (e),  
(f ), (i), or (j), as the language of the proposal on its face meets these require-
ments. 
 165. Id. art. 31(a). 
 166. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 165; PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, 
at 318. 
 167. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 319. 
 168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b). 
 169. TRIPS Article 30 states that “[m]embers may provide limited excep-
tions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such excep-
tions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” Id. art. 30. 
 170. Id. art. 31(c). 
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Fourth, the license must be “terminated if and when the 
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to 
recur.”171 This termination decision may consider the interests 
of the licensee.172 The compulsory licensing regime permits li-
censes for only a class of patients who will benefit from the pro-
cedures because they meet certain criteria. When no patient 
meets the specified criteria, the license ceases to exist. How-
ever, if patients continue to require the procedure, the license 
will continue. Although this approach results in a potentially 
indefinite license, TRIPS does not require the right to be lim-
ited in time.173 Instead, it must only be limited to the extent 
that circumstances require.174 Thus, the proposal is consistent 
with TRIPS Article 31(g). 
Fifth, and perhaps most important, is the requirement that 
“the right holder . . . be paid adequate remuneration in the cir-
cumstances of each case, taking into account the economic 
value of the authorization.”175 This remuneration should be ap-
proximately what a license would cost if the patent owner were 
to grant it.176 This provision is the most evident reason that the 
royalty-free license created by § 287(c) cannot pass muster as a 
compulsory license under TRIPS.177 In contrast, the compulsory 
licensing approach requires the board to determine an appro-
priate licensing fee. Thus, it provides remuneration and is con-
sistent with TRIPS. 
3. Effects on the Incentive to Innovate 
The primary concern with eliminating medical procedure 
patents is that private investors will refuse to invest in non-
patentable procedures.178 Compulsory licensing addresses this 
concern by providing patentees with royalties at fair market 
value. While compulsory licensing with minimal compensation 
may have deleterious effects on innovation, providing royalties 
 
 171. Id. art. 31(g). 
 172. See id. (providing that liability is “subject to adequate protection of the 
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized”). 
 173. See id. (requiring termination only “if and when” it is no longer neces-
sary, not when it is no longer necessary (emphasis added)). 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. art. 31(h). 
 176. GERVAIS, supra note 108, at 166. 
 177. See Ho, supra note 9, at 669. 
 178. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch); Noonan, supra note 2, at 656. 
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at fair market value provides adequate incentives.179 Although 
patentees will not get the monopoly benefit that they could get 
by refusing licenses, this result is justified by the public benefit 
of wide access to procedures.180 Since the purpose of patent law 
is not individual reward,181 “[t]he essential needs of the society 
as a whole may outweigh the exclusive rights of an individual 
patentee.”182 As with individual licenses, investors in this sys-
tem will recoup their investments through royalties. Thus, this 
system provides the necessary incentive that patent law strives 
to maintain. 
4. Financial Costs of Licensing 
Opponents claim that licenses will raise the cost of health 
care, because the licensing fees will be passed on to the pa-
tients.183 However, as described in Part III.A, the cost to pa-
tients is far greater if the procedure had never been developed 
or freely shared in the first place. Under a compulsory licensing 
regime, patentees will not be able to abuse patents by refusing 
licenses or by demanding exorbitant fees. Instead, the board 
will determine a reasonable royalty to encourage innovation 
without placing unreasonable costs on the public. Thus, a com-
pulsory licensing scheme ensures that procedures will be devel-
oped and shared while preventing unreasonable excess costs. 
5. Transaction Costs and the Chilling Effects of Potential 
Litigation 
Some commentators are concerned that healthcare costs 
will increase because doctors will need to research patents to 
avoid infringement.184 While this compulsory licensing regime 
requires a patentee to take reasonable steps to negotiate an in-
 
 179. See Vastano Vaughan, supra note 132, at 104. 
 180. Cf. id. at 101 (“U.S. Congress balanced human need for access to 
medical procedures against the potential damper on innovation and concluded 
that human need was paramount.”). 
 181. See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 17, at 2–6; Burch, supra note 18, 
at 1148. 
 182. Kirby W. Lee, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in the United 
States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. 
REV. 175, 181 (2003). 
 183. See Miller, supra note 59, at 445–46; Meier, supra note 1, at 266–67. 
 184. See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (“[P]hysicians face a sub-
stantial legal risk every time they decide to introduce a new procedure or a 
modification of an existing procedure . . . . because use of a patented procedure 
without [a license] constitutes unlawful infringement.”). 
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dividual license, as required by TRIPS,185 the patentee may 
waive this requirement to decrease transaction costs. Patentees 
therefore have an incentive to waive this requirement so they 
will receive the same remuneration without the expense of ne-
gotiating with multiple individual licensees. Thus, universal li-
censes will cover most procedures. The patentees will also have 
an incentive to inform all doctors and healthcare entities about 
the procedure and universal license. If patentees teach more 
doctors about the procedure, they gain potential licensees. This 
approach will reduce the onus on physicians to research pat-
ented procedures. 
Even in the rare case that a patentee does not submit her 
patent for a universal license, incentives for innovation justify 
the small risk of litigation. Although the AMA expressed con-
cern over litigation, the “economic realities of modern American 
patent infringement litigation do not suggest that a wave of 
medical procedure patent litigation is about to sweep over the 
country.”186 The risk of litigation from unintentional infringe-
ment is relatively small, because the people most likely to en-
force their patents are those attempting to recoup significant 
investments.187 It is also unlikely that a court will award an in-
junction if ethical concerns suggest that the patented procedure 
should be available to the public.188 Thus, the incentives to in-
 
 185. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b). 
 186. Noonan, supra note 2, at 661. 
 187. Cf. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Sen. 
Hatch) (“Historically, surgical procedures are not patented. When they are, it 
is usually because it is required as part of a business plan to attract the neces-
sary capital for research and development.”). 
 188. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that traditional principles of 
equity are applicable in intellectual property disputes. See Ebay Inc. v. Mer-
cexchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006). In doing so, the Court rejected the 
rule that a court will award permanent injunction in patent disputes upon a 
showing of infringement and validity. See id. at 1841. Thus, in order to receive 
a permanent injunction:  
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered irreparable in-
jury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction. 
Id. at 1839. If withholding a patented procedure from the public is unethical, 
the public interest would be disserved by a permanent injunction, so this four-
factor test will not be satisfied. 
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novate that patents provide justify these slight risks, which are 
required by TRIPS.189 
  CONCLUSION   
In its implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), Congress failed 
to address compliance with TRIPS. This omission resulted in a 
TRIPS violation with a potentially huge impact for the United 
States. Trading partners could use the United States as an ex-
ample to justify other exceptions to patent enforcement, creat-
ing problems for intellectual property enforcement abroad. 
However, repealing the statute creates serious ethical prob-
lems. Alternatively, excluding medical procedures from pat-
entability will not provide the necessary incentive to innovate 
in an increasingly expensive field. A compulsory licensing 
scheme addresses the ethical concerns while providing an in-
centive to innovate and remaining consistent with TRIPS. En-
suring that the United States is in full compliance with TRIPS 
will set an example to its trading partners, encouraging them 
to do the same. This approach strengthens the ability of the 
United States to enforce intellectual property rights abroad at a 
time when patenting those rights is of the utmost importance 
for United States companies and legislators. 
 
 189. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, art. 31(b) (requiring an attempt 
to individually negotiate a license). 
